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TOGETHER AGAIN
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL *
Gee, it's good to be together again.
I just can't imagine that you've ever been
gone!
 It's not starting over, it's just going on!
The Muppets Take Manhattan



Duncan Kennedy and I go back a long way – to the first Critical Legal
Studies meeting in Madison, Wisconsin in the summer of 1977. Being together again,
even only intellectually, is always fun, for when reading any new attempt by Duncan
to write history I am usually guaranteed two things. The Three Globalizations of Law and
Legal Thought: 1850-2000 is no exception. First, I always will learn something that I
would never have come upon any other way. Second, it can be guaranteed that
Duncan will enrage me. Before I explain how these two responses are true in this
case, it would be best for me to explain what Duncan’s piece is and is about.
The Three Globalizations is an example of the use of structural analysis to
understand the position of contemporary legal actors. The point of this effort is to
provide such actors, specifically those on the left, i with suggestions for ways that the
current constellation of legal thought might allow for arguments to be made that
might support the causes of the various pieces of the Party of the Left. The argument
that Kennedy makes in this effort is historical, in the sense that it documents change
over time, but not causal, in that it mostly avoids assertions about why such
structures of legal thought as he documents take the form that they do or why the
change from one structure to another takes place. Because the historical argument is
structural and eschews causal speculation it is relatively easy to summarize.
For Duncan the story of legal thought, or at least the portion that he wishes
to tell, begins in the 1850s. This is his well-told story about Classical Legal Thought,
(“Toward a Historical Understanding”) an understanding of law that he sees as
having given out by the onset of the First World War. This understanding was based
on a strong distinction between public and private spheres of autonomous action, a
commitment to individual and property rights and a belief in legal interpretation as a
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process of deduction from within a coherent, and equally autonomous, legal order.
These elements fused into a program for law that emphasized fault and the freedom
of the individual will to act in furtherance of its own projects.
Rather than following Classical Legal Thought with what to American
academics is the normal trilogy of Sociological Jurisprudence, Legal Realism and
Legal Process, (Duxbury) Duncan instead posits a unity between these three bits of
jurisprudence that he calls The Social. He dates this understanding of law to the years
between 1900 and 1968. While acknowledging that The Social had developed in
opposition to Classical Legal Thought, Duncan sees it as equally importantly
affirming law as a purposive activity that featured regulatory mechanisms that would
bring about “the evolution of social life in accordance with ever greater perceived
social interdependence.” (“Three Globalizations” 22) It emphasized group, not
individual rights, social welfare as producing social justice, the primacy of institutions
and institutional arrangements, and more than a bit of corporatism.
Duncan’s third period, extending from 1945 to 2000, conspicuously lacks a
name. Though some people might expect that he would describe this period as the
synthesis of Classical Legal Thought, seen as a Hegelian thesis, and The Social, seen
as a Hegelian antithesis, Duncan eschews any such interpretation. Instead, he
presents his view of this period of law “as the unsynthesized coexistence of
transformed elements of CLT with transformed elements of the social.”(“Three
Globaliztions” 63) To him it seems to emphasize somewhat contradictory things -human rights and nondiscrimination, the rule of law and pragmatism, and the
possibility for multiple and conflicting projects of normative reconstruction of
society so as to emphasize The Social or Classical Legal Thought or some mix of
both.
For Duncan each of these understandings of law has its own visions of
economic life – the free market, market alternatives, the pragmatically regulated
market, respectively. Each also spread globally from a specific national sight –
German, France and the United States, respectively, hence the first words of the title
of his piece, The Three Globalizations. Overall, after luxuriating in the great and
insightful specificity of his insights, the reader has the impression that true to his
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structuralist roots, for Duncan thought happens, sometimes in reaction, sometimes
in synthesis, with what came before, but happens relatively autonomously from other
cultural, economic, political or social projects and so can be, and was, shaped in
specific ways in specific national, colonial or post-colonial circumstances.
With the basic structure and content of Duncan’s narrative set forth it is time
to return to First and Second. As for First – learning -- I am totally fascinated with
the information Duncan provides about the details of French and German
scholarship in law during the second half of the Nineteenth and the first half of the
Twentieth Centuries. Likewise, his reports about the work done by his graduate
students on Asian, African and South American law are quite enlightening. Duncan is
obviously an excellent thesis advisor. I am even more impressed by Duncan’s
attempt to make sense of the deployment of legal rhetoric over the past fifty years. I
now understand clearly what I saw only as a confused mess before I read this piece.
And last, it is nice to see Duncan continue his attempt to rewrite the categories with
which we think about the history of the past 150 years in legal thought. ii As is the
case with legal doctrine, until we have different categories, we will be unable to think
different thoughts. And God knows we need different thoughts!
As for Second – enragement -- like much of Duncan’s work this piece
presents law bloodlessly thinking itself up with only the modest aid of scholars sitting
in offices while they think deep thoughts and write deeper books. For him, ideas are
at best loosely tethered to humans, but seldom, if ever to what this old Midwestern
Populist is not embarrassed to call the “real,” even the old fashioned Marxian
“material,” world of humans doing things to people and things, for reasons spanning
the spectrum from love though indifference to hate, to secure emoluments from
honor through dueness to lucre, on the basis of justifications from right through use
to might. My objection to Duncan’s stories about law is not the old Marxist claim
that law is epiphenomenal and thus irrelevant to material life, but that, as Duncan
tells these stories, law’s materiality, both as a matter of origin and of destination, does
no work. It is off stage as it were, if not off scene, and thus at the least too messy for
the law professor to deal with. It is as if Duncan wishes us to watch the tip of the oar
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and not the legs, back and shoulders of the oarsmen, to ignore the cadence of the
coxswain and the gaze of The Great Helmsman.
These are harsh words I suppose. They should not be taken to mean that
nothing has changed in Duncan’s story about legal thought over the past forty plus
years. I note that now there is explicit room for action on the part of local legal elites
with respect to the shape of a particular instantiation of each of the three
globalizations, such that there were various brands of The Social from Fascist to
Social Democratic, just as it seems to me that there may be various brands of
capitalism. (Schlegel) And a bit of economic life has seeped into the story with the
appearance of, among other things, import substitution strategies for developing
countries, just as was the case under Hamilton’s plans for the economic development
of the Early American Republic. iii Various post-war financial institutions make
appearances as well. All of this is for the good. But a full-blown situatedness of any
of Duncan’s three brands of legal thought we do not yet have.
I do not propose to more than suggest the absent situatedness. It has taken
me over fifteen years to begin to understand the relationship between law and
economy in the United States since 1865, only one of many material aspects of law.
So, I will mostly stick to what I know best – American economic, social and political
history. But, I do wish to add a bit of concreteness to Duncan’s story by focusing on
what he calls globalization, in particular to the globalization of economic life.
However, I do not wish to start in 1860, but rather in the early Nineteenth Century.
And with another great structuralist – Fernand Braudel.
In Civilization and Capitalism, Braudel tells a story about economic globalization.
It is a very long story totaling almost 2000 pages, and even I would not have read all of
it had the effort not been part of a program of rest designed to recover from an
episode of carpal tunnel acquired when working on a new laptop. The story is also a
very interesting one in which Braudel explains the slow shift of the center of European
commerce from Venice to Antwerp to Genoa to Amsterdam and finally to London. In
doing so he makes clear that his is the story of a world economy, not the world
economy.
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Braudel’s story is one about globalization not because it makes the claim that
the entire world looked to Venice as the center of the world economy. Rather, it is a
story of globalization because what counts as the center of an expanding horizon
depends on where one starts. In 1250 the globe was just the same size as it is today,
but most everyone’s world was quite a bit smaller. The southern European world of
which Venice was the center was the world of the Mediterranean, primarily its
eastern end. Northern Europe had no commercial center; it was primarily a world
apart. To the extent that the two worlds met it was at the great fairs in the
Champagne region of France, southeast of Paris.
It is clear from his story that for Braudel economies can change geographic
shape over time. And though in Civilization and Capitalism he concentrated on
economic life, regularly other topics appear in his story. This is because for Braudel
no economy exists in isolation from, or is determined by, the rest of life. The space
occupied by a world economy was also occupied by “other spheres of activity –
culture, society, politics – which are constantly reacting with the economy, either to
help or as often hinder its development. . . . One could formulate the following
equations in any order: the economy equals politics, culture and society; culture
equals the economy, politics and society, etc.” (Perspective of the World 45)
For Braudel, any economy has an hierarchical structure with “a narrow core, a
fairly developed middle zone, and a vast periphery.” (Perspective of the World 39)
Money flows to the center and practices from it, though ties are looser and life more
rudimentary the farther from the center one travels. He sees the core/periphery
model as true for culture and probably society and politics too, though in these latter
two cases a geographic array is obviously the wrong image. However, for Braudel,
these structural similarities do not imply that all spheres of activity share the same
center. For example, he argues that Florence was the cultural center of Europe at the
same time that Venice was its economic center.
Where law and legal theory fit in all of this is not clear. Braudel seldom
speaks of any law other than commercial law. A new colleague, an analytic
philosopher I might add, said, “Everywhere.” This seems correct, though a bit
stretched since Braudel thinks of culture as the art and drama and music of the
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wealthy, dominant classes, the group that is the focus of his references to politics
too, at least until he reaches the late Eighteenth Century and the first Industrial
Revolution in England. Still, his understanding of globalization seems to me to be
adequate for present purposes. And so with it as an aid, I wish to build a story
parallel to Duncan’s.
In the early Nineteenth Century, London was still the economic center of
Braudel’s Europe, though what we now call Germany, then an ugly map of a growing
central state and surviving principalities and small kingdoms, was Europe’s cultural
and intellectual center. The geographically large, but otherwise small, United States
was at best part of the middle zone, limited as it was to small towns largely
surrounded by subsistence agriculture once one got more than a short way from
places where water born travel was easy. The country was little more than a supply
region, to use Jane Jacob’s terminology, (57-71) with respect to international trade. iv
Primarily it sent natural resources and eventually one agricultural product – cotton –
to Europe in exchange for manufactured goods, and of course that unnatural
resource, slaves.
Though the growth of factories/mills came over fifty years earlier in England
than in New England, by the 1840’s it could be said that an industrial economy had
developed along the Atlantic coast, as well as along a few inland waterways. In the
1830’s large factories that had once produced only yarn destined for home
manufacture of textiles had grown to weave and die cloth as well. The most
advanced of these, such as the mills at Lowell, provided housing and social activities
for workers – New England farm girls who would work for a few years and then
return to their families, and most often marriage. However, by the 1850’s the growth
of the railroad network acted to expand the effective scope of competition beyond
what were once relatively protected, narrower markets that offered producers a
modest ability to maintain price above marginal cost.
The combination of this competitive pressure with an increase in
immigration and the expansion of the products of mass manufacturing into items
such as clocks, guns and locks, turned millwork into anything but an exercise in
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modest paternalism. Whole families, traditionally English and Scottish, increasingly
increasing Irish families and non-english-speaking northern Europeans who
benefitted from the reduced cost of ocean travel that accompanied the development
of the steamship. They came to work in the mills and were left to fend for
themselves in local communities. Labor unrest soared.
After our uncivil war, the continuing growth of the railroad network, funded
significantly with watered securities, again intensified competitive pressure by further
expanding its geographic scope. Simultaneously, the long deflation that followed that
war strained capital structures. Mass manufacturing spread out from New England
and the costal Mid-Atlantic states into the Mid-West, principally into the area east of
the Mississippi. No matter where located, pressure on wages, one of the few costs
that manufacturers could control, brought significant labor unrest. Soon the flood of
immigration from southern and eastern Europe and the continuation of the process
of de-skilling jobs that factory production implied made cheaper un- and semi-skilled
labor a plausible alternative to more skilled Americans. Shifting employment toward
lesser skilled immigrants added to this unrest.
Manufacturers and transportation providers responded to competitive
pressures in one other way. Initially, they combined local entities in the same trade
under names like “Union,” that gave away its motivation, or “Buffalo,” that hoped to
draw on local pride. Later came larger national combinations -- first trusts, then
holding companies, finally outright mergers -- all for the purpose of acquiring some
control over pricing. Similarly, wage earners tried to secure some price control over
their product through unionization. Farmers, consumers and their do-gooder allies
sought legislative relief, most famously through passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act and the statute establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission. Later came
the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission. The
country finally had a permanent national bank, though, as these bits of legislation
suggest, it still was quite ambivalent about judicial and administrative process.
During the years up to WW I immigration reached it peak. As the country’s
population both increased and spread westward, the increasingly national market
provided a base from which large manufacturing firms became significant exporters
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to Europe and South America. The pure size of the national market, when combined
with the growth of the export market, was sufficient to make the United States a
significant part of, and then the dominant player in, the now North Atlantic
economy. The center of that economy thus shifted from London to New York, as
was made clear when that war was stalemated until the Americans entered the fray.
However, given American isolationism, London remained the political center of the
North Atlantic economy, though the cultural and social parts of the North Atlantic
world remained deeply fragmented.
In the years immediately before and after this first “World War”, v the
American manufacturing economy remained centered in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic
and Midwest. It was largely focused on the production of metals and metal products,
starting with the natural resources necessary for such production. A good deal of this
production was increasingly directed toward consumer products for a middle class
that had expanded from the traditional bourgeois shopkeeper and small businessman
to encompass the network of middle-management staff and line jobs that seemingly
were a necessary part of large corporations. The major product was the automobile,
but “labor-saving” electrical products were also important. In the long term, the
most significant product turned out to be the truck.
During these years, small businessmen, mostly wholesalers, retailers and
farmers, tried to gain some of the control over price that large manufacturers had
already secured. One vehicle was fair trade legislation, but the major ones were ideas
about associations of manufacturers and marketing cooperatives of farmers, both
designed to bring “order” to markets and so “stabilize” prices. Wage earners continued
their push for unionization, but found that legislative success was seldom met with
judicial approval, an experience that consumers and other do-gooders shared.
The Great Depression, far more severe than those of 1873, 1885, 1893 or
1907, truly crippled the American economy over the ten plus years following its
onset in 1929. It started in Europe and ended in War. Federal response to this
debacle produced much legislative and judicial discord, but when that discord
subsided careful observers would have noted that the growth of the administrative
state had begun with modest structural regulation of banking and securities, modest
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protections for unions and their members, price and entry regulation for the new
airline and communications industries, and a start toward the provision of social
insurance benefits covering old age and unemployment.
There is no reason to believe that any of these legislative programs, which
followed in the footsteps of previously existing programs in other North Atlantic
economy countries, did anything to hasten the end of the Depression. Indeed,
Federal programs directed toward alleviating the impact of that catastrophe were
quite limited and short lasting, except for the efforts of the Civilian Conservation
Corps in building structures in local, state and national parks. Rather, it was the onset
of war in Europe that quickly restarted the American economy, as preparations for
war had restarted the German and Japanese economies.
Manufacturing employment quickly rose when domestic and foreign buyers
came with money. Consumer purchasing soon recovered. And then, after the United
States entered the War, it crashed. Many companies that had produced consumer
products “volunteered” to do war work, quite often unrelated to the products
previously produced. My favorite of these transformations is the Wurlitzer
Corporation. It manufactured torpedo detonators, though before the war it made
both organs and jukeboxes. Consumer products were in short supply, when not
simply unavailable because their production was prohibited. Rationing covered many
consumer staples in order both to limit and to fairly distribute the supply that was
not being delivered to the armed forces. Workers, now including more women than
ever before, had little to spend their wages on and so bought war bonds with
increased savings.
This war again proved that the United States was the center of the North
Atlantic economy and also the nascent North Pacific one. Indeed, at the end of the
War, the American economy was the only functioning economy to be found among
the major members of the North Atlantic economy, other than Canada’s tiny one.
The subsequent expansion of our economy was amazing. Soon consumer goods
were to be found in great abundance; new, mostly suburban housing was being put
up everywhere; and the significant, unionized proportion of the working class
expanded quickly. An hourly middle class was born.
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A system of interstate highways knit the county together in ways that the rail

system never had. Airplane travel helped cut travel time even more for those who
could, or whose employers would, afford it. The governmental structure forged
during the Depression and partly legitimated by the administration of production
during The War seemed to be working just fine. Few noticed that the spread of
manufacturing into the South and West, a result of wartime policies directed toward
industrial dispersal, that when combined with the development of a highway system
all but designed for trucks, meant that the industrial center of the American economy
could more easily shift.
American aid to Western European national economies (and Japan) helped
them restart production and our purchases from them soon provided profits on the
basis of which those economies expanded. However, at the same time it was
apparent that, as a result of “The War,” Washington had become the political center
of the North Atlantic economy, a fact made most clear by the recurrent attempts of
the French state to assert that such was not so. The center of culture was still in
dispute, though it too it had shifted, in this case to Los Angeles by the beginning of
the Sixties. Only social structure was significantly unsettled with the United States as
the only major hold out from the European states’ model of broad social insurance
protection, a difference that would easily have been resolved in European favor had
economy, politics and culture not have already migrated westward.
And then it all fell apart. Duncan dates the coming apart to 1968; he is more
attuned to the significance of the events of that year than I. Instead, I would choose
1962, the year of the adoption of the Interest Equalization Tax, or 1973, the year
when the United States finally admitted that it was no longer going to adhere to the
gold exchange standard and when the OPPEC oil embargo and fourfold price
increase in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War shocked everyone with unheard of
increases in gasoline and lines at gas stations. But these are differences in degree, not
in kind. What now is clear, to me at least, though not to many other people then, and
still some now, is that the economic model that was shared by the nations that made
up the North Atlantic economy was based on the ability to insulate national
economies from each other.
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That insulation was created by transportation costs and/or regulatory and/or
customs barriers. In European countries such insulation also protected the
competitive advantage that national health insurance gave to their manufacturers.
However, the growth of the Common Market in Europe and the decline of ocean
freight rates, especially following containerization for the movement of goods to, and
not nearly as often from, the North Atlantic economies, as well as the vaunted status
of The Dollar as the currency of choice for international trade purposes and the
flood of dollars unleashed by our little, disastrous misadventure in Vietnam,
eliminated the ability of these countries to insulate themselves from other economies,
as well as from each other. Serious competition had broken out again. The results in
the United States are well known.
No one to this day knows what to do either to alter this situation or to create
an alternative economic structure that might mitigate the effect of the return of price
competition where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Oh, yes, there are many
nostrums. There are the people who believe that Humpty Dumpty can be put
together again and those people who believe that unraveling the modest social
contract that we have is the right answer. Some believe that specialization in finance
is a good idea, if only we could get rid of pesky regulations, vi while others believe
that green energy will lead the way to a brighter future. A return to the gold standard
is bruited about, as if a radical reduction in the money supply would bring joy to all,
and more education is prescribed, as if a world where every one had a Ph.D. would
be one where everyone would want to live. The list goes on and on, but the fact that
there is such an endless list is the best evidence that there is no obvious answer.
Now then, it is time to consider Duncan’s story about Classical Legal
Thought and The Social. Here, just as he says is the case, we can see The Social
began to appear at sometime near the apogee of Classical Legal Thought. Those
terms are not ones I like, but I can see their virtue as an attempt to avoid old
arguments over Formalism and Sociological, then Realist Jurisprudence. After all, all
law is a formalism; it is a simple canard to call one type of legal thought a formalism
and then attach to the name a negative connotation. The real difference between
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Classical Legal Thought and The Social is that the former most prominently seeks
justification for legal norms in logical entailment from assumed first principles, vii
while the latter seeks justification from considerations of assumed social advantage.
However, I wish to start this discussion, not where Duncan does, but
somewhat earlier – in the Early Republic. As Howard Schweber makes clear in a
wonderful piece, the legal theory that dominated the much smaller United States of
the early Nineteenth Century was well described as “Protestant Baconianism.” This
understanding of legal method combined Baconian induction from observation of the
natural world, including the humans in that world, with a Protestant understanding that
study of the natural world would demonstrate the truth of the biblical worldview. It
was thus a view of nature and law as constrained by revealed truth.
Schweber argues that this synthesis was forged to avoid both Blackstone’s
notion of law as the custom of the English judiciary, an authoritative source that the
post-revolutionary generation believed did not fit American circumstances, and the
notion of law as one of the moral sciences, an exercise in deduction from republican
first principles, such as was taught by George Wythe, an understanding that for some
implied the possibility of law contradicting scriptural authority. Whether or not this is
true, Schweber treats the sources of Protestant Baconianism as both the obvious one,
Francis Bacon, and the Scottish Common Sense philosopher, Thomas Reid.
Whether similar sources for this understanding of law could be found in
continental Europe, as Duncan has presented for both Classical Legal Thought and
The Social, I do not know, though I am sure Duncan could find out. He might even
already know. However, it probably matters little; in the provinces all sorts of strange
ideas take root and survive, as the story of Montaillou demonstrates. (Le Roy Ladure)
In these years the United States was clearly one of the provinces, though not one of
the most distant. No, what is important for me is the fact that the presence of a
Protestant Baconian understanding of law raises the question of how it might have
come to be displaced by Classical Legal Thought.
Schweber suggests that the impact of Darwinian thought made implausible
the notion that induction could be limited by scriptural authority. That is probably
true, though I think that there are other things going on. Capitalism is a bitch. It is
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quite scary to have all of one’s accumulated capital at risk in a market where marginal
cost equals marginal revenue and any decline in revenue raises the possibility of the
steep, well-greased slide into bankruptcy. Now admittedly, living thusly is hardly as
scary as not knowing where one’s next meal is coming from, but to understand law,
which is to say money, one has to understand the mind of those with money. And
so, were I talking about law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries in England
I would focus on the fears of the landowning class, as well as the tradesmen’s fears
that drew on the even older idea of a just or fair price for one’s services or wares.
The great theme of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century economic history is
the attempt of capitalists to avoid competition, to gain even modest control over
price. Doing so, exploiting the space between trade and theft, can be had through
squeezing suppliers or employees or purchasers. At least the last two might be
squeezed in circumstances that allow for combination, and so limit competition, but
squeezing employees alone is always a possibility. Remember, a marginal decrease in
cost is still better than none; a few cents more in price or less in wages can make a
big difference. However, using law to accomplish this kind of squeezing in a world of
Protestant Baconian thought is difficult. Jesus was not exactly a capitalist apologist,
whatever Weber’s Calvinists might have been willing to tell themselves. (Weber) In a
land where individual freedom, for everyone but slaves and women at least, and in
some corners even the limitations on the freedom of these people was being
questioned, it was difficult to argue directly that because I, the capitalist, cannot sleep
well at night, you, the employee or customer, should contribute to stilling my fears.
Such an argument was not very Christian.
If a direct argument was difficult to sell, what other arguments were available
in the law’s commodious green bag? Well, as Duncan surely knows for he
singlehandedly recovered one of the relevant works from the historical dustbin, the
early Nineteenth Century was a world where Blackstone’s notion of powers absolute
within their spheres had met the long insistence on the language of rights drawn
from land law. These notions could be tied together with three things: the ancient idea
of law as a formal language that was resuscitated by the recovery of Roman Law,
Coke’s understanding of law as the special language of lawyers, and the nascent
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English interest in the logical analysis of legal concepts, of what became known as
analytic jurisprudence. With all of these pieces at hand, it was rather easy to give up the
Protestant part of Protestant Baconianism, keep a little Baconianism, as Langdell did
by focusing on rummaging through the corpus of reported cases, (Kinball) and ignore
results by focusing on logical entailment as a method of analysis. Taken together, these
tools were flexible enough to stiff consumers with caveat emptor (the Latin here is
significant) and workers with the combination of the common law’s abhorrence of
combinations in restraint of trade and love for the protection of property rights.
Now, is it in any way necessary that the language of rights and the idea of
justification by logical entailment from first principles worked to put customers and
workers at the mercy of capitalists and merchants? Of course not. After all, the
language of workers rights eliminated the capitalists in Soviet Russia, and without the
notion of justification by logical entailment. But languages are not free from baggage,
the economic, cultural, social and political circumstances in which they might be
deployed. Thus, it is highly unlikely to be the case that if the languages that made up
Classical Legal Thought were not available to American lawyers because these
counters had not been created earlier in Common and Civil legal thought, someone
would have had to invent them. Most likely, they would have gone uninvented. The
capitalists would have made do with some other languages, possibly with some other
results on the ground for consumers and employees. However, it is the economic,
cultural, social and political circumstance that “tilt,” to use Morton Horwitz’s old
phrase, (Holt) languages in one direction or another, and so it is a mistake to suggest
to students that the formal fact of availability of a language suggests a real possibility
of adoption in pursuit of any possible objective.
Then, what of the slow shift from Classical Legal Thought to The Social and
beyond? Here it seems to me important to remember that in the United States the
drive to advance the causes that made up The Social – children, consumers,
employees, farmers, immigrants, mothers and women – began to gain momentum
only after the center of the North Atlantic economy began to shift to New York.
This was at a time when much consolidation of American business into large units
had begun to tame the rigors of capitalism. Which is not to say that the capitalists
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were happy with the changes based on The Social on any of these fronts. They were
not. But it is unlikely to be a coincidence that movement on many of these fronts
came after the significant enlargement of the upper-middle and middle class that
comprised management of the now larger corporations, and especially with the
squeezing of such people during the Depression. One might also add to this change
the radical limiting of immigration after WW I, an event that might well have
provided the middle classes, largely Protestant, it must be remembered, with a sense
that their social circumstance were not going to be overwhelmed by hordes of people
speaking strange languages, many of them Roman Catholic even.
The flush times that the economy experienced in the years after WW II
solidified the modest social gains made during the Depression, as well as permitted
the expansion of the middle class downward to encompass the unionized elite of
employees. Further expansions of social welfare measures continued into the Nixon
Administration and then they stopped. What had happened? Well, as far as I am
concerned: one big thing. The economy that made social expansion possible had
come apart. The middle classes were feeling squeezed. Be cautious when wishing for a
middle class democracy. The middle classes are large enough, mean enough and
unsophisticated enough to chase after any political nostrum, however implausible, that
promises to increase their disposable income, even marginally. As is the case with the
capitalists who get squeezed by competition, there are only a limited number of
options for reducing costs. Government expenditures, which of course translate into
taxes, are an easy target, especially if cost reduction comes out of someone else’s hide.
Now, of course, this was not all that had happened. The modest gains from
the civil rights statutes and programs brought out a certain amount of latent, and
some not so latent, racism. The white middle classes experienced these changes as
otherwise undesirable people butting ahead of “my place” in a line that already
seemed likely to run out of goodies before everyone was served. In addition, busing
for vague racial parity brought the feeling that neighborhoods were being invaded, a
sense that “my space,” the space that I had worked so hard to secure, was being
threatened. Similarly, there was the social revolution that was Woodstock and Hair and
anti-war protests and pro-choice rallies and bra-burning. For a significant part of the
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middle classes these events brought forth the feeling that was no longer “my country,”
an undesirable feeling for people who had served in WW II and so saw this country
the savior of the “free world.” Later, the rise of Hispanic immigration, legal or not, and
the rhetorical shift from Americanization to multi-culturalism only added to the fear of
white Protestants that their domination of the country was coming to an end, oddly a
fear that was shared by white lower-middle class ethnic Roman Catholics.
These cultural cum social cum political concerns can also be seen in the
European piece of the no longer coherent North Atlantic Economy as the European
Community’s immigration rules and guest worker policies undermine the already
fragile sense of national cultural identity in many member states. I have, however, a
sense that in these countries the political response has not yet wrecked the havoc on
the expanded lower-middle class that has been the case in the United States. As is
often the case with Country Music, two verses, a stub and two different choruses
from a recent Ronnie Dunn song, “Cost of Livin’” make this havoc palpable, and so
frame the political response from that class effectively.
The middle-middle class is afraid that it will soon be part of the lower-middle
class, while guys like me, a law professor at a modest university, and so with a
modest salary by law professor standards, thinks nothing of throwing $30K at a child
already over 30 in the hope, hardly a guarantee, that with another, this time
“vocational,” masters degree my no-longer child will finally settle down and earn a
modest living. The astonishing thing about Duncan’s story is that the legal theory of
the past forty years can be plausibly organized in two neat, if not necessarily
coherent, piles. That we do not see complete chaos is a monument to the
effectiveness of the legal mind, or maybe just Duncan’s mind.
Now that the reader has skimmed through all of this obscuranta, I suppose
that person might wish to ask, “So, what does this all have to do with “The Three
Globalizations?’” First, I hope that reader is willing to entertain the possibility that
there have been more than three globalizations. Second, that legal thought, as a part
of at least some of those globalizations (and I do believe all is likely to be the case),
can be more fully understood by taking into account the economic, cultural, social
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and political circumstances in which it participated. Third, that the centers of
economic, cultural, social, and political life that make up a world that for its
inhabitants is global move over time. When so doing they reconstitute core, middle
zone and periphery. And fourth, that at this time there is no economic center to the
global world of the North Atlantic. I doubt that there is a political one. Though
culture, now deeply imbued with the idea that the market serves everyone, or at least
everyone who is willing and able to pay, seems still centered in Los Angeles, there is
no reason to believe that the central social structure is anything but up for grabs.
By saying “up for grabs” I wish both to suggest that Duncan has done a
wonderful job of making clear a structured lack of legal intellectual centeredness that
is our current circumstance and that this lack opens possibilities that need to be
taken seriously. At the same time, I must note again that the range of possibilities is
now, and will continue to be, significantly structured by the other economic, cultural,
social and political circumstances in which legal action will be taking place. After all,
we have no way to know whether the current unsettledness will turn into a North
Atlantic-Pacific Rim economy centered somewhere in China or something else more
or less broad. However, one might suggest that if China centerness is what comes to
pass, and especially if the political center follows the economic, it is unlikely that the
Party of the Left will be any more pleased with the on-the-ground political results of
such a shift than it is with the present uncentered situation.

Notes
*

Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. This paper was
prepared for a workshop on “The Three Globalizations” held at the University of
Colorado Law School. I will to thank Justin Desautels-Stein and Pierre Schlag for
inviting me and the participants for not being audibly bewildered by this contribution
to their joint effort. Fred helped, but did not conspire.
i.
I use “left” rather than Duncan’s and others’ use of “progressive” because I
find it difficult to identify exactly what is progressive about “progressive” political
positions. Hopefully, the phrase is something more than a nostalgic reference to the
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early Twentieth Century Progressives, or even worse, an attempt at identifying the
Party of the Left’s causes with some notion of teleological progress. If it is an
attempt to distance these causes from their association with socialism, whether
Marxist or otherwise, I can confidently report that the attempt is an abject failure.
ii.
I might note however, that the persistence of “Classical Legal Thought” is
simply a matter of branding, as shown by the later appearance in the piece of
“neoformalism” but not neoCLT. And “The Social” is just plain ugly. For a set of
categories to catch on they have to trip off the tongue, in addition to being a fairly
good approximation of the set of ideas referred to. Formalism and Realism and Legal
Process do this job. Classical Legal Thought and The Social do not, however useful,
in the case of The Social, the recategorization is.
iii.
“Unitedstatesian,” the word that Duncan uses to avoid “American,” is too
ugly a word to use, however generous it is to the sensibilities of his South and
Central American, as well as Canadian, students.
iv.
Jacobs credits Braudel with originating the concept, (236 n.6) but she uses it
far more regularly that he does.
v.
The use of this phrase say much about how the peoples of the North Atlantic
economy thought of themselves.
vi.
A significant amount of the Wall Street “product” invention over the past ten
or more years was designed to shift bank services away from marginal cost products
and toward products which, because of market opacity, had the characteristic of
producing fee income far above the cost, to say nothing of the value, of the service
provided.
vii. There may also be a reference to Greek classicism hidden away in Duncan’s
language, as recognizing a classical impulse toward radical simplification of form to
the baroque organization of law in terms of the forms of action. I continue to prefer
the term Formalism because a formal justification of formal distinctions seems to me
to be significantly different from an explicitly normative justification of formal
distinctions. Nothing turns on this dispute about words, unless Classical is taken to
suggest oldest, which, of course, this form of legal thought is not, in American at
least.
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